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In Defense of (Punishment) Theory, and Contra 
Stephen, 
A Reply to DeGirolami 
 
 
Chad Flanders* 
 
 
Marc DeGirolami’s searching recent essay in this Journal1 is—appropriately 
enough—hard to categorize, or even to summarize.  It aims to criticize the rise of 
“theory” in the academic study of criminal punishment, but it does not stop at 
merely being critical.  Rather, it attempts to revive the thought of James Fitzjames 
Stephen, and also to urge a better way of looking at the study of punishment: one 
that is more historically oriented as well as more pluralist.  Stephen’s thought, 
DeGirolami complains, has been misunderstood and flattened, and it is our loss.  
We have lost not only the views of a surprising, and surprisingly relevant, 
historical figure, but more importantly we have lost a kind of sensitivity that is 
missing in much of contemporary philosophy of punishment. 
I want to resist DeGirolami’s praise of Stephen, but more than this, I want to 
register an objection to his near-universal panning of theory.  Theory in any case is 
poorly defined by DeGirolami, which ironically prevents him from seeing how 
Stephen himself was a theoretician, and how DeGirolami’s own pluralism is a 
theory, albeit an incomplete one (at best).  Moreover, it is theory itself that shows 
us how Stephen is mistaken on several key substantive issues and why we are right 
to leave Stephen largely behind. 
My paper divides into three parts.  The first part is heavily critical of 
DeGirolami’s case against theory: the brickbats he throws at theory are poorly 
developed and for the most part misfire.  What we need is not to get rid of theory 
(supposing this is even possible), but to have a better understanding of what theory 
is.  The second part, more positive, aims to develop in a little more detail Stephen’s 
positions on various issues.  Stephen had theories about criminal law and how to 
think about it, theories worth taking seriously.  But at the same time, they were 
theories we should ultimately reject.2  I briefly conclude on the relevance of 
                                                                                                                            
*   Assistant Professor of Law, St. Louis University.  I am indebted to Christopher Jones and 
Sam Dickhut for excellent research assistance.  Thanks also to the participants in the N.Y.U. Criminal 
Theory workshop: Dan Markel, Michael Cahill, Kim Ferzan, Anthony O’Rourke, and especially 
Marc DeGirolami.  Finally, thanks to Monica Eppinger, Efthimi Parasides, and Jeff Redding of the 
SLU Law monthly writing group.  All mistakes are my own.  My long-standing debt to the work of 
Martha Nussbaum is obvious throughout.       
1   Marc DeGirolami, Against Theories of Punishment: The Thought of Sir Fitzjames Stephen, 
9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming Mar. 2012), [hereinafter, Against Theories].   
2   JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY (Univ. of Chi. Press 1991) 
(1873) [hereinafter, LEF]; 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF 
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history to contemporary punishment theory and expand a little more on what I’ve 
said earlier about what punishment theory should become.  Pace DeGirolami, we 
need punishment theory more than ever but punishment theory of the right kind. 
 
I. THE ALLEGED TROUBLES WITH THEORY 
 
The debate about the value of theory is as old as theory itself: at least as old as 
the dispute between Aristotle and Plato on the nature of philosophy.  How closely 
should philosophy be tied to conventional norms and the appearances of things?  
Or should it abstract from these, distrusting them?3  Is philosophy primarily a 
matter of rules to follow, or must we be sensitive, and aim to make precise, 
particular judgments about matters?  Interestingly, the debate about the role of 
theory itself risks becoming extremely theoretical, suggesting, perhaps, that at a 
certain level theory is unavoidable, as DeGirolami himself seems to concede.  The 
only real dispute then is what exact shape our theories should take, what things 
they should be attentive to, and why. 
 DeGirolami argues at length that the Anglo-American study of punishment 
has become too theoretical, but he is frustratingly unclear about what he means by 
this.  DeGirolami certainly thinks that some theory is bad, but the nature of that 
badness is hard to pin down; it is likewise hard to pin down what DeGirolami 
proposes to replace theory with.4  The claims made in the early parts of his essay 
are heavy on the rhetoric and thin on analysis.  So we should proceed carefully, 
testing DeGirolami’s arguments about what theory is, and asking ourselves 
whether we should accept them.  And it is DeGirolami’s more general claims about 
the meanings and shortcomings of “theory” that I want to test first, before 
proceeding to his criticism of punishment theory per se.  If we can accept theory, 
or at least theory defined rightly, then we may be less persuaded that punishment 
theory is as wrongly directed as DeGirolami says it is.     
 What, then, is theory for DeGirolami?  Let us look at a quote early on from 
DeGirolami’s paper, where he describes how punishment theory today has become 
more theoretical (in a bad way): 
 
Theories of punishment today . . . generally display a methodological 
commitment to systematization.  Punishment theorists are commonly 
interested in distillation and exclusion, in declaring what punishment 
justification is in—politically legitimate, morally just, or otherwise 
                                                                                                                            
ENGLAND, (London, MacMillan & Co. 1883) [hereinafter, HCL2]; James Fitzjames Stephen, 
Variations in the Punishment of Crime, 17 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 755, 765 (James Knowles ed., 
1885) [hereinafter, Stephen Variations].   
3   See generally, ANTI-THEORY IN ETHICS AND MORAL CONSERVATISM (Stanley G. Clark & 
Evan Simpson, eds. 1989); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS 
IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY, 240–63 (1986).   
4   The answer to this seems to be “pluralism,” but as I argue below, pluralism is also a theory; 
see infra pp. 5–6. 
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institutionally necessary—and what is out.  Arguments about which 
punishment aims are “necessary,” and which others are “sufficient” 
exemplify the objective of system—the desire to keep a careful and hard-
edged division between the core and the periphery, the legitimate and 
illegitimate, the included and the excluded, in constructing fully rational 
justifications.5 
 
Punishment theory becomes bad, says DeGirolami, when it becomes 
“systematic.”  And systems are defined by their desire to rigidly separate those 
justifications which are preferred in some way and those which are not.  In this 
way, they are “exclusive.”  But it is hard to see why system in this sense is bad.  Of 
course, theories of ethics should exclude those justifications which are politically 
illegitimate, morally unjust, and institutionally unnecessary.  One would have 
thought that no one would want those in a theory of punishment.  If this is the type 
of hard edged division—generally speaking, between good and bad arguments—
that DeGirolami is objecting to, it is hard to see what he is getting at and why we 
should follow him.6   
So too there seems little to find that is fundamentally awry in the idea that 
some justifications of punishment may be better than others and better capture the 
point of punishment.  Those justifications which do capture the purpose of 
punishment will be at the “core” of any theory; those justifications which are less 
important, or could be dispensed with, will occupy at best that theory’s periphery.  
Of course, some theories may be wrong about what is at the core and what is at the 
periphery—this will be a source of controversy between theories—but the mere 
drawing of this line cannot be per se unacceptable.  Similarly, if one denies that a 
proffered aim of punishment is not necessary to understand what punishment is, 
one needs to make an argument why that is so; one cannot simply balk at the very 
notion of a “necessary aim” for punishment.      
More generally, moral theories generate normative judgments: that is what 
they do.7  If a theory did not tell us what was necessary for a punishment to be a 
punishment, or (alternatively) could not give us grounds to criticize some 
punishments as not punishments at all, then this would be good reason to reject 
that theory and to wonder whether it was a theory at all, rather than a description.  
DeGirolami may be objecting to this aspect of theories, but I doubt it.  If he were, 
he would be saying that we could not say anything normative about the field of 
                                                                                                                            
5   Against Theories, supra note 1, (manuscript at 8).   
6   See also Against Theories, supra note 1, (manuscript at 2), where DeGirolami accuses the 
methodology of systematization as “carefully distinguishing the reasons that should count from those 
that should not in constructing an integrated whole.”  Although it may depend on what “integrated 
whole” means, it is hard to see what is wrong with carefully distinguishing reasons.   
7   See Martha C. Nussbaum, Why Practice Needs Ethical Theory: Particularism, Principle, 
and Bad Behavior, in 57 THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE (Stephen J. Burton, ed. 2000) 
(theories test the correctness of our judgments).   As should be obvious to those who are familiar with 
it, I am deeply indebted to this essay and its understanding of “theory.”   
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punishment, which would not just be curious, but a practical disaster: it would 
leave us without the resources to talk about the ways in which our current practice 
is normatively indefensible, which it almost certainly is.8   
Again, however, this does not seem to be DeGirolami’s aim.  He is not against 
critical thinking regarding punishment at all (nor was Stephen); his essay seems 
motivated by a desire to have us think better about what punishment’s aims are and 
what a good justification for punishment would be.  He wants us not to ignore 
certain aspects of punishment which are important to understanding that 
institution.  In this respect, he has no brief against theory.  But explicating 
punishment’s true aims and purposes means drawing lines (even “hard edged” 
ones) and talking about what is in and what is out insofar as punishment is 
concerned.  “Systematization” is just a “boo” word for DeGirolami, an ugly label 
that obscures clear thinking about the justification of punishment.  It may be easy 
to rail against system, but harder to say why we should resist “careful” thinking 
about the necessary normative foundations of punishment in favor of some ill-
defined alternative.      
And indeed DeGirolami concedes that the role of systematization in “parsing, 
distinguishing, refining, excluding, and purifying … is an important one.”9  So 
what is the difficulty then?  If systematization is defined simply and broadly as the 
job of normative theorizing, in precisely the way DeGirolami relates, one would 
indeed be hard pressed to deny its importance, and even its inevitability.   
But DeGirolami says that there are three problems with the tendency towards 
systemization.  I deny that these are problems, or at the very least, that they are 
problems internal to the task of systemization.  They either betray DeGirolami’s 
own theoretical commitments, or they are problems that are not rightly laid at the 
door of system.  These problems are, in DeGirolami’s ordering, 1) systematic 
theories are not useful to lawyers, judges, and legislators, 2) theory/systematization 
is monistic, reducing the range of values at play in punishment to only one or two, 
and 3) theory/systematization obscures our understanding of the history of theories 
of punishment. 
There is, first, the question of the usefulness of theories.  I would note at the 
outset that DeGirolami’s emphasis—later in his essay—on pluralism in 
punishment may have a similar problem: of what use is it to judges and lawyers to 
say that there are many conflicting and incompatible values at play in punishment, 
without saying which ones are more important, or which ones will trump others in 
a given circumstance, or how to balance those judgments off one another?  As 
DeGirolami notes in passing, the usefulness of a theory will depend on whether it 
gives instructions on how to decide concrete cases.  Pluralism, as DeGirolami has 
                                                                                                                            
8   See generally Chad Flanders, Retribution and Reform, 70 MD. L. REV. 87, 91–96 (2010); 
David Gray & Jonathan Huber, Retributivism for Progressives, 70 MD. L. REV.  141, 143–44 (2010).  
9   Against Theories, supra note 1, (manuscript at 10).   
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it, just leaves us with a list of values and urges us to be sensitive to all of them.10  
But sensitive how?   
I will return to this point later in my conclusion.  But DeGirolami’s complaint 
about the “scholasticization”11 of punishment theory neglects the various ways 
theory might matter to practice.  For initially, we might think that theory can work 
indirectly, and over time, as we get clearer on our ideas, those ideas might filter 
down in contingent ways and affect practice.12  Some of these ways might be more 
direct than others.  A book in defense of uniform sentencing guidelines written by 
a judge who is both smart and politically influential may make a lasting impact on 
the debate over how we should sentence people.13  Or the idea that punishment 
should be expressive and that shaming punishments well embody this ideal might 
move judges and legislatures to consider those punishments legitimate; a claim on 
the other side, that shaming punishments are inhumane and do not fulfill the ideals 
of punishment we should have, might move judges and policymakers to reconsider 
their decision.14   
The ways in which theory will influence practice will often be a matter of 
chance, but this does not make theory irrelevant or unimportant.  Theorists should 
still work to frame the debates correctly and contribute to that debate, using the 
arguments and ideas they deem best.  Their theory may be more or less abstract, 
more or less immediately practical and relevant, of course, but these facts will not 
prevent that theory from being relevant in any sense or at some later time.  It may 
be that theorists should pay more heed to how their ideas should be applied,15 but 
this does not mean that they should not do theory.16  They should just do it better, 
with more attention to detail and implication.  Or some theorists may prefer to 
paint the broad picture, leaving others to fill in the exact details.  They also serve 
the cause. 
DeGirolami has us imagine a judge reading over philosophical and legal texts 
and then deciding on one theory or another to use in sentencing.  This is meant to 
                                                                                                                            
10  Against Theories, supra note 1, (manuscript at 56) (“Punishment pluralists, unlike their 
monistic brethren, take a genial, open, and welcoming view of the possibility that an unforeseen and 
unnoticed argument for or against punishment might complicate and further becloud the swirl of 
values that attends the practice of punishment.”).   
11  Against Theories, supra note, (manuscript at 10).   
12  Martha C. Nussbaum, Still Worthy of Praise, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1776, 1793–95 (1998).   
13  MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1972). 
14  See Flanders, supra note 8, at 102 (summary of academic debate on shaming penalties).   
15  Flanders, supra note 8, at 137–140.   
16  Stephen stresses as much, in a passage DeGirolami quotes: “The construction of theories 
and their application to practice ought to go hand in hand; they ought to check and correct each other, 
and ought never on any account to be permitted to be long or widely separated.”  Against Theories, 
supra note 1, quoting LEF, supra note 2, at 131.  Strangely, DeGirolami takes this to be evidence of 
Stephen’s antitheoretical bent, when it is in fact no such thing: it is rather an explanation of how we 
ought to do theory.  
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be somewhat comical, I suppose, but some judges may actually do this.17  And 
even if they do not, it does not mean that these theoretical ideas cannot be brought 
to the judges’ attention through briefs by the parties, or by conferences, or by 
conversations (or by law clerks).18  Certain ideas can be in the air, and 
theoreticians contribute to what ideas are in the air.  They help frame the ways in 
which we think about certain issues, or at least they can.  And judges and 
legislators may not think in whole theories; they may think in fragments of 
theories.  But even these fragments can influence policy and practice.  Nor do 
judges and legislators need to think in exactly the same terms as theorists, or with 
the same degree of precision.19   
So I think the worry about a system’s irrelevance to practice is overblown 
(and moreover, unfair, or at least unfairly targeted: if it is a problem, it is not a 
problem to punishment theory as opposed to contract or tort theory).  DeGirolami’s 
second worry, however, is not practical but conceptual.  Basing his point on a long 
quote from Steven Smith, DeGirolami worries that punishment theory may make it 
impossible for us to appreciate “incompatible alternatives.”20  As DeGirolami 
elaborates, “[t]he capacity to support multiple otherwise logically conflicting 
notions of, say, retributivist justice, or varieties of retributivism and deterrence 
simultaneously . . . may well be a cost of the current methodological orthodoxy.”21 
It is difficult to see exactly what is meant here.  If DeGirolami is saying that 
the best theory will enable us to make sense of a variety of values, then he may be 
right, but he will be at the same time endorsing a theory nonetheless.  Call it 
“pluralism.”  Now, to a first approximation, there can be deep pluralism or shallow 
pluralism.  Deep pluralism would say that some values are logically incompatible 
or incommensurable.22  Shallow pluralism would say that there are multiple values, 
but either they can be reduced to one value, or we can have a theory that tells us 
how to prioritize values, as well as the places where some values are more 
important than others; there is a way to organize values, if not reduce them entirely 
                                                                                                                            
17  A good example is the Bergman case, where Judge Frankel carefully analyzes what 
interests the state has in punishing Bergman: and he even cites Kant!  Bergman v. State, 416 F. Supp. 
496, 499–500 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).  Some judges (or former judges) actually also write in the area of 
sentencing, see e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1193 (1985); Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, 115 
Yale L.J. Pocket Part 137 (2006), http://thepocketpart.org/2006/07/gertner.html; Michael McConnell, 
The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 665 (2006).   
18  See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 488 F.3d 1244, 1254 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing the work of 
Douglas Berman); United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 604-06 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing work of 
scholars on shaming punishments); United States v. Jackson, 835 F.2d 1195, 1199 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(Posner, J. concurring) (citing theoretical work on deterrence).   
19 Theorists can also bring attention to what ways current practices rely, if only tacitly, on 
certain theories. 
20  Against Theories, supra note 1, (manuscript at 12).   
21  Against Theories, supra note 1, (manuscript at 12).   
22  I borrow from DeGirolami here but do not pretend to be giving an exhaustive definition of 
any sort of pluralism.  See Against Theories, supra note 1, (manuscript at 49).   
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to one.  I suspect DeGirolami favors a deep pluralism, at least sometimes, and so 
he would reject theories that embrace only a shallow pluralism. 
But this is not an objection to theory that DeGirolami is making, then: he is 
making an argument in favor of a particular theory.  He is saying that there are 
plural values that we have to use in making punishment decisions, and that 
monistic theories cannot accommodate this diversity.  That is a knock against one 
theory made by another theory, not a knock against theory per se.  There is nothing 
that says that the only theory, that is, the only theory that counts as “theory,” is 
monism.  Pluralist theory is theory, too. 
If pluralism is not what DeGirolami means here, then he seems to be 
embracing logical conflict for its own sake, and this is scarcely desirable.  The 
more charitable interpretation, I think, is that oftentimes there will be many values 
at play in a decision.  But to rest on this point is unsatisfying, and we should press 
on and see if there is any theoretically sound way to reconcile those values, or to 
create institutions that preserve both values in a satisfying way, one that avoids 
tragedy.23  We should not try to reduce values that are distinct of course, but that 
should not relieve us of the obligation of analyzing those values and seeing 
whether they fit together, and how.  Logical conflict is not a place where the mind 
(or a society) can rest comfortably.  Moreover, there is a practical difficulty to such 
ad hocery.  It is very hard to review.  If a judge simply says, well, it’s a complex 
combination of values, how are we to test whether she has gotten it right, other 
than to investigate the values separately, see what they are and see if the judge has 
struck a reasonable balance between them?  But to do this requires a theory. 
DeGirolami lists as the “final danger” of systematization that it may obscure 
to us certain ideas about the purpose and point of punishment that “flourished in 
the past.”24  He cashes this out as meaning that we may tend to distort the ideas of 
past thinkers, when trying to fit them into our present day categories.  But this, it 
should be noted, is a danger with any historical investigation, that we will read the 
past through the lens of the present, and remake it into our image.25  This is not a 
danger intrinsic to theory but to historical inquiry generally.  And of course it is a 
risk we should be aware of, and try to avoid.   
DeGirolami wants to make this point especially with regard to Stephen: he 
wants to show us how we have distorted his thought.  He makes several, quite 
correct observations about how Stephen has been received, and how he has been 
put in boxes that do not fit him altogether well.  It should be said that some of 
these efforts were meant to be charitable to Stephen (some explicitly so), to take 
his sometimes meandering and rhetorical observations and tidy them up, put them 
into some coherent order.  This is not altogether a bad thing, and it is certainly the 
                                                                                                                            
23 See Nussbaum, supra note 7. 
24  Against Theories, supra note 1, (manuscript at 13).   
25  As Nietzsche puts it somewhere, the risk is that we as scholars dig up what we ourselves 
have buried.  See the reference in ALLAN BLOOM, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO xiv (2d ed. 1991). 
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right of philosophers to put a person’s theory in the best form it can be, at least the 
best form as it seems to them.  (I say more about this in my conclusion.)     
Nonetheless, I do not want to defend every philosopher who has attempted to 
characterize Stephen’s thought, either fairly or unfairly.  This is too great of a task, 
and anyway not necessarily one that is worth taking: who ultimately cares if some 
people got Stephen wrong?26  What we should be concerned with is if we can 
make sense of him, and how we should make sense of him, and most important, 
whether we agree with him.  This is what I want to do, below, in the next Part of 
my reply.   
 
II. STEPHEN’S LEGACY 
 
The real heart, and the challenge, of DeGirolami’s paper comes in his 
discussion of Stephen, whom he champions as a kindred anti-theorist.  Stephen 
disliked and distrusted theory, according to DeGirolami, and his writings testify to 
that.  Moreover, because we are in an age of theory, we risk misunderstanding 
Stephen and miscategorizing him.  And it is true that at times Stephen seems to 
resist theory, to prefer the ad hoc judgment to the rule. Certainly Stephen’s 
rhetorical style lends itself to such an assessment.  Like Nietzsche, to whom he 
bears comparison,27 Stephen will favor the zinger, the witty bon mot, to push his 
point across.  In this way, perhaps, he is again a resister of system, much like 
Nietzsche perhaps was.28  He is delightful to read in the same way Nietzsche was, 
too.  (Unfortunately, he also sometimes has the strained and galling machismo that 
Nietzsche had a tendency toward.29) 
But as one who favors theory,30 I find it hard to understand Stephen outside of 
the context of certain theoretical debates and to see him as a party (witting or not) 
to these debates.  And even if Stephen did not understand himself to be doing 
theory, (I am not sure this is right) I feel it is how we can best understand him.  We 
start with the categories we have, and try to see how he fits within them, what 
moves he is making.  Sometimes this distorts, but sometimes it can clarify.  The 
proof of the pudding is in the eating.   
 I want to fix on three areas where DeGirolami investigates Stephen’s 
thought, and where I think we can see clearly what theoretical position Stephen 
takes, and also why we are better off leaving Stephen behind, for the most part: (1) 
                                                                                                                            
26 I exclude historians from this, of course.  But I assume DeGirolami’s interest in Stephen 
is not simply historical.   
27   For good examples of Stephen’s style, see Richard A. Posner, Foreword to JAMES 
FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY (3d ed. 1991). 
28  ALEXANDER NEHAMAS, NIETZSCHE: LIFE AS LITERATURE (1985). 
29  Martha C. Nussbaum, Is Nietzsche a Political Thinker?, 5 INT’L J. OF PHIL. STUDIES 1 
(1997).   
30 Chad Flanders, Can We Please Stop Talking About Neutrality? Koppelman between Scalia 
and Rawls, PEPP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
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the question of whether it is right to feel hatred towards criminals, (2) the 
relationship of morality to the criminal law, and (3) the role of judicial discretion 
in sentencing.  Stephen had definite positions on each of these issues and gave 
reasons in support of them.  The question is whether we should find those reasons 
persuasive.  This is another way in which theory is inevitable and necessary: when 
someone takes a position, we need to see if there is a justification for that position, 
and then to see if we agree with it.  This is the path normative theory takes.31 
 
A. Hating Criminals 
 
DeGirolami rightly tries to limit the scope of Stephen’s infamous remark that 
it is a morally legitimate thing to hate criminals.  Stephen was only referring to a 
subset of crimes, DeGirolami correctly notes, and only the very worst crimes.32  In 
those instances, Stephen said, it is right to hate criminals. Here, resentment is a 
virtue and not a vice and punishment confirms the rightness of our hatred.  This 
seems clear enough, but it has spawned a host of misinterpretations of Stephen’s 
true motives.  DeGirolami corrects the prevailing wisdom to this extent: Stephen 
does not offer hating criminals as the only justification for punishment, and it does 
not mark him out clearly as a retributivist or a consequentialist.  Rather, the idea of 
hating criminals seems to stand on its own, as a potentially independent 
observation about the nature of punishment and about its goodness.  I do think, 
however, that such an observation ultimately works best within a consequentialist 
framework, both because our hatred of criminals serves to vent societal anger (a 
safety valve function) and also it acts to deter others: no one wants to be hated, to 
incur the wrath of others.33  In general, Stephen thinks that hating criminals does a 
good job teaching us that criminal acts are hateful.34   
But even with all this being said, we are left with Stephen’s firm insistence 
that it is morally right to hate criminals, and that this is part of the foundation of 
criminal justice, even “the principle” that it “proceeds upon.”35  What are we to 
make of this?  We should start by noting that Stephen is making a normative point 
here, not a descriptive one.  He is not saying that it so happens that we hate 
criminals; if this were his observation, then it would be hard to disagree with him.  
Of course we will tend to hate criminals when they do terrible things.  The 
                                                                                                                            
31  As DeGirolami concedes, Against Theories, supra note 1, (manuscript at 4) (“If we are to 
adopt Stephen’s ideas, they must be politically and morally attractive—they must be justified.”).   
32  Against Theories, supra note 1, (manuscript at 16).   
33  Here I agree with Alice Ristroph and her interpretation of Stephen.  See Against Theories 
supra note 1, (manuscript at 23); Alice Ristroph, Third Wave Legal Moralism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1151, 
1156–57 (2011).  See also HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 37 (1968) 
(noting that Stephens does not defend punishment merely as a means of revenge but rather claims 
that “punishment is justifiable because it provides an orderly outlet for emotions that, denited it, 
would express themselves in less socially acceptable ways”). 
34  Alice Ristroph, Third Wave Legal Moralism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1151, 1157 (2011). 
35  HCL2, supra note 2, at 81.   
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question is rather whether we should hate them, or better, whether gratifying that 
hatred should be one of the “objects for which legal punishments are inflicted.”36  
First we have to point out a few confusions that Stephen is guilty of, and 
which require some conceptual clarification.  Stephen, I think, initially misfires 
when he attempts to justify the emotions of hatred and anger per se, as if these 
were at issue.  It is one argument—we might call it the “humanitarian” argument—
that hatred and vengeance are wicked in themselves.  It is another thing, something 
which Stephen attempts to defend, that hatred and vengeance should be a rationale 
for public policy.  It would be a non sequitur to say that because hatred and 
vengeance are permissible moral emotions, they should be the basis for punishing, 
anymore than saying that love is a good emotion that it should be the basis for, 
e.g., welfare policy.37  The fact that hatred and vengeance might be permissible or 
even laudatory emotions in some contexts does not mean that they will be so in 
every context; in fact there are good reasons to restrict certain emotions from 
politics, where passions run high and calm deliberation is comparatively rare.38 
More particularly, Stephen also makes a mistake in what he contrasts his 
defense of hatred and anger with.  He limits his conceptual options, so that it seems 
that the choice we have is between a theory that looks at punishment only in 
Benthamite deterrence terms and one which acknowledges that we have an interest 
in punishing criminals for the wrong they have done to us by gratifying our hatred.  
Stephen writes dismissively of those “modern writers” who regard the criminal law 
“as being entirely independent of morality.”39 For these modern writers, the goal is 
to deter crimes, not to condemn them so that if it were enough to deter a man from 
killing to fine him one shilling, then this would be enough.  Indeed, on the 
Benthamite view, we would not be justified in punishing (or threatening to punish) 
any more than this.  What this misses, Stephen says, is the actual moral hatred we 
feel against the murderer, which a fine of one shilling would not be adequate to 
express. 
But I think there is another conceptual possibility that occupies the space 
between expressing our hatred through punishment and looking at punishment in 
deterrence terms only.  That option is what is filled by theorists of retributive 
justice, who work hard to distinguish their theories from theories of revenge, which 
                                                                                                                            
36  HCL2, supra note 2, at 83.   
37  Except, perhaps, as a metaphor.  See ALAN GEWIRTH, THE COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS 83 
(1996) (describing the ideal welfare state as “an institutionalization of love”).   
38  See especially James Whitman, A Plea against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 93 
(2003) (“Most ordinary human beings are simply not capable of sober deliberative reasoning where 
crime is concerned. When ordinary people talk about crime and criminals, fear and contempt rapidly 
overwhelm their faculties of reason. Indeed, I would suggest that criminal justice simply cannot be a 
proper topic of public discussion in a true deliberative democracy.”).  I think Whitman goes a bit far 
here, but he is generally on the right track.  See generally Chad Flanders, Retribution and Reform, 70 
MD. L. REV. 87 (2010) 
39  HCL2, supra note 2, at 79.   
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is not far from what Stephen is advocating.40  For Stephen, punishment is a vehicle 
for satisfying the hatred we feel for certain criminals.  For most retributivists, 
punishment is the state meting out some form of deserved suffering.41  It need not 
be accompanied by any emotion, other than possibly a sense of injustice being 
remedied.42  Now, it may be that at the end of the day retribution is 
indistinguishable from revenge, that retribution is simply revenge under a different 
name, and that retributive punishment cannot be understood, let alone justified, 
without understanding it as a means of gratifying our hatred.  It may be that 
Stephen is just more honest than modern-day retributivists.  
This may be true,43 but I think there is a firm distinction to be made between 
accepting that we might hate criminals and thinking such hatred might motivate us 
in punishing them according to their desert and validating these feelings (we 
should have “a proper hostility to criminals”; vengeance is felt by a “healthy” 
mind), 44 or even encouraging them, as Stephen does.  Indeed, Stephen worries that 
in the society of his time, people were getting too soft, that  
 
 [I]n the present state of public feeling … there is more ground to 
fear defect than  excess in these passions.  Whatever may have been the 
case in periods of greater  energy, less knowledge, and less sensibility 
than ours, it is now far more likely  that people should witness acts of 
grievous cruelty, deliberate fraud, and lawless  turbulence, with too little 
hatred and too little desire for deliberate measured  revenge than that 
they should feel too much.45 
 
I suspect that we have more to fear, now anyway, about the excess of our 
passions against those who have committed crimes rather than that there is too 
                                                                                                                            
40  The locus classicus attempt at this distinction is ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXPLANATIONS 366–368 (1981).   
41  This need not be simply or only physical suffering; I include deprivation of liberty as a 
form of (objective) suffering the state can impose on offenders.  See Dan Markel & Chad Flanders, 
Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive Justice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 907 
(2010).  
42  Stephen writes that a criminal should be understood as “a person who ought to be punished 
because he has done something at once wicked and obviously injurious in a high degree to the 
commonest interests of society.”  HCL2, supra note 2, at 76. Retributivists should be wary of the idea 
that punishment should be of those who are wicked, when this is meant as something more than that 
they have broken the law and injured the interests of society.   See Dan Markel & Chad Flanders, 
Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive Justice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 907, 
945 (2010).  
43  To be clear, I emphatically believe this is not true, and moreover I deeply hope it is not 
true, although I think the line between retribution and revenge can be very hard to draw in practice 
44  HCL2, supra note 2, at 91.   
45  HCL2, supra note 2, at 82, 93.   
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little of it.46  That a retributivist should, and will, worry about this excess is an 
important point of contrast with Stephen.  And it is precisely because of this risk—
of excess, of retribution spilling over to revenge—that we should worry about 
bringing such “hot” emotions into the politics of punishment.47  
Nor should we forget that Stephen endorsed many illiberal or inhumane 
punishments, including flogging and (I would add) the death penalty.  He talked of 
the need to “destroy” the wicked, in extreme cases, and also asserted that on “the 
view” he took “of the subject would involve the increased use of physical pain, by 
flogging or otherwise, by way of a secondary punishment.”48  Not only should 
flogging be made more common, Stephen said, it also “should be made more 
severe” for “[a]t present it is little, if at all, more serious than a birching at a public 
school.”49 
These sentiments strike me as not only nonsense, but vicious and cruel 
nonsense.  Fortunately, we have distanced ourselves from them, or transcended 
them altogether,50 with the idea that some punishments are impermissible, based in 
part on the norm that human beings, however bad, ought not to be treated in certain 
ways.  But Stephen does not simply accept the use of certain illiberal punishments, 
he welcomes them, and such welcoming seems to stem from an idea that it is both 
inevitable and perfectly alright that we hate criminals and see them as “the natural 
enemies of inoffensive men, just as beasts of prey are the enemies of all men” or 
that some criminals are no more than “wolves” who should not be allowed to live 
in a civilized country.51   
Can Stephen’s theory of (one of) punishment’s purposes exclude these types 
of consequences?  Are there limits we can put on gratifying the hatred of 
criminals?  It seems not.  Stephen says it is a purpose of punishment to express our 
hatred for criminals, and these punishments will do that job.52  At least 
retributivism in principle can put a limit on punishment, both its type and its 
duration, however hard it will be to draw that line.  Moreover, retributivism of a 
suitably well-worked out form will show that there is space to acknowledge the 
legitimate feeling we have that criminals ought to be punished, without confusing 
that with hatred.  This is why retributivism, for all of its flaws, seems to me a much 
                                                                                                                            
46  Although another problem may be that we are for the most part indifferent to the suffering 
of the many who languish in our prisons and jails (separated from us not only physically, but in most 
cases also by class and by race).  But whether we hate too much, or care too little, the problem 
certainly is not that we hate too little.   
47  Whitman, supra note 34.   
48  HCL2, supra note 2, at 92.   
49  HCL2, supra note 2, at 91.   
50 For the most part.  But see PETER MOSKOS, IN DEFENSE OF FLOGGING (2011). 
51  HCL2, supra note 2, at 91, 92.  
52  HCL2, supra note 2, at 83 (“In criminal legislation the distinction is of greater importance, 
as one of the arguments in favour of exemplary punishments (death, flogging, and the like) is that 
they emphatically justify and gratify the public desire for vengeance upon such offenders.”).   
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more promising and progressive research agenda than does Stephen’s vindication 
of hatred.  We are right to move beyond his idea that hatred ought to be one of the 
motivating features of the criminal law. 
 
B. The Source and Scope of the Criminal Law 
 
DeGirolami also wants to save Stephen from the common interpretation that 
he promoted “legal moralism,” defined (very roughly) as the idea that the state 
should enforce moral norms through the law.  When phrased this way, it is very 
hard to disagree with!  Of course there are certain moral wrongs that the state is 
justifying in punishing: murder, rape, and the like.  No one should deny the 
importance of legal moralism in this sense, although there will be some dispute 
about which moral norms the state should enforce, and how those moral norms 
become enforceable by moral sanction rather than by other, social sanctions.53  
Legal moralism of the objectionable sort might be that any and all moral norms 
should be enforced, but very few people hold this position.     
So let us start, first, with the question of what moral norms should be 
enforced, and here we come to a very famous debate between Stephen and Mill in 
the 19th century and between Hart and Devlin in ours.54  Stephen, and Devlin after 
him, acknowledged the possibility that the law could be used to regulate and ban 
certain self-regarding behaviors.  Stephen, indeed, pushed hard against the very 
idea that some actions could be merely self-regarding.55  Mill, of course, 
disagreed.56   
Now DeGirolami is right to caution us against misreading Stephen here, but I 
want to insist that there is still a real point of dispute between Mill and Stephen, 
and that Mill has the better of the argument.  DeGirolami makes essentially two 
points defending Stephen.  The first is that Stephen is clearest, and most insistent, 
that the main area where morality and the criminal law overlap is with the very 
worst crimes.  It is the case of the grosser harms to others that we see most clearly 
how the criminal law upholds our moral ideals.  And it is hard to disagree with 
Stephen here: it is true that in cases of the worst moral wrongs (murder, rape), we 
agree that the criminal law should prohibit them, and punish those who flout the 
norms against them.  But saying that these types are at the core, and provide the 
best example of the overlap of the criminal law and morality, does not say what 
else the criminal law could also cover when it comes to moral wrongs. 
                                                                                                                            
53  Dan Markel, Retributive Justice and the Demands of Democratic Citizenship, 1 VA. J. 
CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2012).   
54  LORD PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965); H.L.A. HART, LAW, 
LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963).. 
55  See LEF, supra note 2. 
56  See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hacket Publ’g Co. 1978) 
(1859).  
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This is where DeGirolami’s second caveat about Stephen enters in: there may 
be other areas where morality should be enforced via the criminal law, but the 
criminal law is a clumsy way to enforce proscriptions against most moral wrongs.  
As Stephen writes (and DeGirolami quotes), the criminal law is a “rough 
engine.”57  It may be hard to prove some moral wrongs, or it may be too expensive 
to go out and prosecute them all. 58  Stephen is especially insistent that crimes, to 
be prosecuted, must have some overt act, but this seems less founded on a principle 
of freedom of thought, than on the idea that crimes without conduct are hard to 
discover, and not worth prosecuting—better to focus on the really serious stuff, if 
we are to bring the heavy machinery of the criminal law to bear on it. 
So it may happen that as a contingent matter, Mill and Stephen would agree 
that certain self-regarding wrongs will not, and should not be punished: Mill as a 
matter of principle (liberty of thought and action) and Stephen as a matter of 
pragmatics.59  But this is unsatisfying, because it means only contingently can we 
say that e.g., the punishment of such things as sodomy is wrong, and should not be 
the object of criminal sanction.  And in fact Stephen seemed unbothered that 
English criminal law at the time treated as crimes some acts “which need not be 
specified … merely because they are regarded as grossly immoral,” such as 
sodomy.60 
The problem is that, at the end of the day, Stephen is not so much a moralist, 
but a conventionalist about the content of the criminal law.61  Vice can be 
punished, and the only restrictions on this are what things people regard as vices 
and the possibility that punishing them will do any good.  Against this is the idea 
that there are certain norms which constrain what things can be punished.  Mill and 
later Hart gave expression to one version of this idea, which is that those acts 
which are purely self-regarding and did not cause harm to others should not ever 
be the subject of criminal law .  Of course pressure can be put on such an idea, viz., 
that there are some harms that are merely self-regarding, and Stephen puts pressure 
on it (as have people ever since Stephen).  But at least it raises us up above 
conventionalism on the criminal law, so that there is some antecedent normative 
constraint on what we can punish (and also on how we can punish).   
Moreover, conventionalism as a theory—for that is what it is, a theory about 
the content of criminal law, what it should contain—is especially risky when it 
                                                                                                                            
57  LEF, supra note 2, at 140.   
58   As Stephen colorfully writes, he has no objection to an Inquisition as such, if it is enforcing 
true morality.  The only question in his mind was whether “the means used to promote [the 
Inquisition’s doctrines] were ineffective, or that their employment was too high a price to pay for the 
object gained.” LEF, supra note 2, at 87. 
59  LEF, supra note 2, at 140-41.   
60  LEF, supra note 2, at 154.   
61  Against Theories, supra note 1, (manuscript at 37) (“Yet a better interpretation may be that 
commonly held moral beliefs with respect to criminality actually do represent a kind of truth with its 
own independent normative force.”).     
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comes to the criminal law, where passions run high, and “moral panics” can lead to 
harsher penalties beyond what  is warranted by the possible social harm.63  At the 
very least, what things should count as crime should be constrained by some 
norms, and not merely by practical constraints regarding what people happen to 
believe, and what they want to punish.  This is what a good theory of the criminal 
law should attempt to do.     
 
C. Judicial Discretion 
 
DeGirolami has done us a great service in pointing attention to Stephen’s 
essay on Variations in the Punishment of Crime.64  The essay is a small gem, well-
written and provocative on a key subject: the question of how much discretion 
should be left to judges in determining sentences.  But DeGirolami misleads when 
he suggests that Stephen’s belief in judicial discretion means that he is against 
theory when it comes to punishment.  For claiming that sentences should be based 
in part on the judge’s own opinion on the matter betrays theoretical commitments 
in two ways: first, it shows that Stephen has a theory about the division of 
responsibility for sentencing, that is, where decision-making power should 
reside,65 and second, that Stephen has a theory about what factors are appropriate 
for judges to consider when they sentence.  To defend these two points, Stephen 
has to give a justification for them, and must necessarily oppose theories that 
would either eliminate judicial discretion, or those that do not agree with Stephen 
about what factors judges should be able to consider when sentencing.  In short, 
Stephen has to do theory when defending his vision of sentencing, and in fact, he 
does. 
There are roughly three areas of controversy when it comes to judicial 
discretion: (1) whether discretion is inevitable in sentencing, (2) whether it is a 
good thing, and (3) if judges either as a matter of inevitability or of rightness do 
have discretion, what considerations ought to move them.66  Now, as to the first 
area, Stephen makes a strong case that some discretion will be inevitable in 
sentencing.  But he makes his case too strongly.   
Stephen argues that “there is no absolute relation between any crime and any 
punishment.”  He concludes from this that “[e]very punishment, therefore, which is 
allotted to any crime will be found to stand in an arbitrary relation to it.”67  It is 
hard not to see some rhetorical license being taken here.  Certainly we can rank the 
severity of crimes in some non-arbitrary way, and that being done, match severe 
                                                                                                                            
63  See generally, MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY (2004).  Sentences and 
sanctions toward sex offenders seem especially to fit in this category.    
64  Stephen Variations, supra note 2. 
65  HCL2, supra note 2, at 88. 
66  The literature on the advisability vel non of sentencing guidelines is now mammoth.  See, 
for a good overview, KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING (1998).   
67  Stephen Variations, supra note 2, at 761. 
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crimes with more severe punishment.68  Even if there is no absolute relation, there 
still can be comparative relationships in punishment, which can give us some sense 
of what punishments are proportional to what offenses.  This may only be true at a 
rough level, but at this rough level we can block at least the descent to total 
arbitrariness. 
Nor should we confuse arbitrariness with discretion, which Stephen may be 
doing.  If appropriate penalties were merely arbitrary, this would not mean we 
should give judges the discretion to decide arbitrarily what they should be.  As 
Stephen admits, we could imagine making a finely wrought judicial code that 
could come close to removing any trace or possibility of discretion.  There may 
even be good reasons for such a code; the point is, it shows that the question of the 
goodness of discretion is analytically distinct from the question of whether there is 
any meaningful (i.e., non-arbitrary) way to rank punishments.  We could 
summarily fix punishments, and leave judges only the job of mechanically 
applying sentences.  This would remove discretion from punishment, but for all 
that, the assignment of punishments could still be arbitrary.     
But then surely the prior question is whether we ought to limit judges in this 
way, or whether we should allow judicial discretion to a greater or lesser degree 
because there is some good in allowing it.  And I think there is some good in 
discretion, for some of the reasons Stephen articulates.  It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to write a criminal code that prescribes “in minute detail the 
punishments to be inflicted in different cases.”69  Some differences between crimes 
will be such that the law covering the crime will not be able to capture those 
differences and yet they may be relevant.  Stephen is quite convincing, even 
compelling on this point but again he takes his point too far.  The fact that we 
cannot have an exact criminal code that will fit every possible variation in a crime 
does not prove that every case is exceptional and so that writing a criminal code is 
useless.  As DeGirolami himself notes, Stephen was a proponent of the 
codification of the criminal law.70  The question then, as always, is a matter of 
degree, and also a matter of on what basis discretion should be exercised. 
On this last point, Stephen is much less compelling, and it is here that we 
might want to more clearly distinguish ourselves from him. Stephen denies that 
there is any problem with disparate sentences per se, that if one criminal gets a 
lighter sentence as a matter of luck, then the prisoner has no right to complain “[s]o 
long as a given punishment is not unusually severe….”71  But we know better now: 
if unequal punishments are given on the basis of race, or some other arbitrary 
factor, then it is not enough that an unequal punishment is not severe for it to be 
unjust.  It is enough that a disfavored reason has resulted in meaningfully different 
                                                                                                                            
68  For an attempt at doing this, see MICHAEL DAVIS, TO MAKE THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE 
CRIME (1992).   
69  Stephen Variations, supra note 2, at 763.   
70  Against Theories, supra note 1, (manuscript at 27).   
71  Stephen Variations, supra note 2, at 759.   
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sentences.  Further, Stephen allows that it might be justified to make an example of 
an offender, if an offence has become common.  In that case, it may be necessary 
“to check it by a severe example.”72   This strikes me as a rather problematic 
reason for a sentence, at least if it is presented as an unlimited principle.  General 
deterrence may be a permissible factor in sentencing, but it should not be a central 
one, nor should it lead to too great of a variation between punishments in order to 
make someone an “example.”   
So Stephen is more persuasive here, on the whole, although he gets carried 
away.  But the broader point surely is that he is making a theoretical argument, one 
that we are, or ought to be, intimately familiar with: it is about the possibility of 
determinate sentences, about the need for judges to exercise discretion, and about 
the factors judges can consider.  This is theory, and it is systematization, and there 
is nothing wrong with that.  Stephen is making distinctions, saying what things are 
favored or not, what things are right as a matter of morality, and drawing 
conclusions from them.  To be pro, rather than anti-discretion is not to do away 
with theory; it is merely to have a different theory. 
 
III. CONCLUSION: HISTORY AND PLURALISM 
 
DeGirolami worries that punishment theorists collectively have gotten 
Stephen almost entirely wrong, that we want to fit him into a particular box, when 
he resists categorization.  I think this claim is exaggerated, or at the very least fails 
to give due deference to the role of theorists vis-à-vis historians.  Historians are 
trying to get at what the thinker really thought, warts, inconsistencies and all.  The 
theorist is trying to give the best account of the thinker, or failing that, to bring out 
what is truly distinctive in that person’s thought.73  When this involves unfair 
distortion that makes a thinker to be not worth taking, this is a bad thing.  But it is 
bad for a different reason than when the historian gets things wrong.  It is bad 
because it leaves us with a less worthy opponent (or ally) in our quest to get things 
right. 
For at the end of the day, that is all that matters.  History can show us routes 
that we should have taken, or can help us to clarify our own positions on matters.74  
When we ignore someone’s distinctive contribution, this is our loss, because we 
have lost an opportunity to think freshly about a topic.  Stephen’s ideas about 
hating criminals fit into this category.  Of course it does not exhaust Stephen’s 
thought.  He also thought punishment served a deterrence function, but the so-
                                                                                                                            
72  Stephen Variations, supra note 2, at 764. 
73  Hart is exemplary in this respect.  H.L.A.  HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963).   
74  As DeGirolami expresses the view (he does not endorse it): “[I]f intellectual history really 
is the tool of normative theory, then there is little reason why it ought not to be used in this fashion.  
What matters most is that the strongest case is made for the normative account being proposed and 
defended, and tactical historical exposition might serve those ends effectively.” Against Theories, 
supra note 1, (manuscript at 48).   
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called “assaultive” aspect of his thought is something that often has been missed 
by retributivist and utilitarian thinkers alike, and it is important to think about.75   
I have urged that ultimately we should reject it; certainly what we need less of 
now is punishment’s dehumanizing and alienating aspects.  What we need more of 
is the idea that criminals are our fellow citizens.76  Yet Stephen forces us to rethink 
what we ought to believe about criminals, and challenges retributivism to prove 
that it can be more than simply a nice way of talking about revenge.  That is an 
important contribution, but it is, at least in Stephen’s case, more negative than 
positive.  I do not think we can or should take seriously as a recommendation the 
idea that it is morally legitimate to hate criminals, to view them as animals that at 
the limit ought to be destroyed. 
DeGirolami at the end of his essay presents his own recommendation about 
theory, which is that we should be pluralists (I am doubtful that Stephen was a 
pluralist, but leave this to one side).  I have already alluded to the way in which 
DeGirolami’s pluralism affects his own understanding of theory.  For him, theory 
tends to be monistic, which would make pluralism the opposite of theory.  I think 
this is a mistake.  Pluralism is a theory about the nature of value, about what values 
there are, and how they fit together.  Moreover, we should be careful not to assume 
all pluralism is the same.   
Kant, to a certain extent, was a pluralist: he believed in both the right and the 
good.  Bentham was probably a monist, although he believed that pleasures could 
differ in intensity and duration.  Mill certainly believed that there were distinct 
kinds of value, which did not just differ in degree; to this extent he was surely a 
pluralist.  But Kant and Mill were certainly theorists, because they did not rest 
merely with the idea that there are different values, they thought hard about the 
questions: how do we order values?  In what contexts and circumstances should we 
favor one value over another?  Is there anything general we can say about how 
values fit together? 
If pluralism is simply the idea that there are many values, it is still a theory 
about the nature of value, but it is incomplete as a normative theory unless it tells 
us what we should do about the existence of plural values, what this means for 
what we ought to do.77  This seems especially important in law, where we at some 
point simply have to make a decision; we cannot stop at the recognition that there 
are a lot of values out there.  If it says we can do nothing, because values conflict 
and are incommensurable and it is a matter of arbitrary choice which value to 
favor, then this is saying something more, but it is a very unhelpful and pessimistic 
something more.  Certainly it falls prey to DeGirolami’s complaint about theories 
                                                                                                                            
75  JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS & MERCY (1988).   
76  R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY (2001).   
77  I’m inclined to put Cahill in this category.  See Against Theories, supra note 1, (manuscript 
at 50).   Cahill himself is cagey about where he stands.  See Michael T. Cahill, Punishment Pluralism, 
in RETRIBUTIVISM: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND POLICY 25, 26 (Mark D. White ed., 2011). 
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not being able to offer guidance, because it amounts to saying there is none to 
give.78 
I think theory has an obligation to give something more than this—but of 
course it needs to be shown that pluralism of the pessimistic sort is false (I think 
this can be done).  Theory needs to be able to give guidance, and yes, it needs to do 
this while still being honest about the diversity of considerations at play.  It needs 
to say at what level some considerations become relevant, and how much weight 
we should give to each of them.  For instance, a retributive theory may allow that 
the cost of a punishment (that prison is more expensive than probation) can matter 
in determining sentences, but that this is best left to the legislature, and that judges 
should mostly worry about the desert of the offender.79  Pluralism can be 
accommodated by noting the diversity of values that correspond to different places 
in the criminal justice system.  And theory can also accommodate pluralism by 
showing that multiple values might be at play in sentencing, but showing that some 
are more important than others, that some are at the core and others at the 
periphery. 
DeGirolami admits that any pluralism will have to do something like this.  
But this inevitably brings him into the realm of theory, with its own risks: will he 
recognize all the relevant values and in the right way?  Will he ignore the ways in 
which values can in fact be accommodated and systematized?  These might be the 
blindnesses that pluralism is susceptible to, but of course these are matters of 
degree.  Systematizers may have their own blindnesses, but this may be as much a 
matter of the kind of theory you hold as it is of the personality of the person 
holding the theory (as DeGirolami admits80).  And surely systematizers will want 
to accommodate all real values in their theory, and not leave anything out.   
When we do theory, we to some extent abstract from the status quo because 
we want to get a critical distance from the status quo.81  Theory has to be informed 
by practice, but it cannot uncritically defer to practice, which Stephen in his 
conventionalist moments does.  If there is any place where we need a radical 
critique of everything existing, it is in the area of punishment, where we should not 
be content to interpret our practice, but should want to change the awfulness of the 
status quo.82  Insofar as the history of ideas helps us to do this job better, we should 
                                                                                                                            
78  Compare also DeGirolami’s work in religious liberty, where he sometimes seems content 
just to point out the conflicts between values, without indicating how we ought to resolve those 
conflicts.  Marc DeGirolami, No Tears for Creon, 15 LEGAL THEORY 245 (2009).   
79  See Flanders, Cost as a Sentencing Factor: Missouri’s Experiment, 77 MO. L. REV. 391 
(2012). 
80  Against Theories, supra note 1, (manuscript at 52).   
81  Chad Flanders, Review of STANDING ON PRINCIPLE, 32 J. LEGAL MED. 337, 341-42 (2011).   
82  See, e.g., Anthony Appiah, How the Future Will Judge Us, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2010, at 
B1 (“We already know that the massive waste of life in our prisons is morally troubling; those who 
defend the conditions of incarceration usually do so in non-moral terms (citing costs or the 
administrative difficulty of reforms); and we're inclined to avert our eyes from the details.”).   
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use it, but when it simply gives a gloss to ourselves at our worst, as Stephen 
sometimes does, we best leave it behind.     
 
